A Strong Point for Humanism (or Glaring Inconsistency)?

By John Feakes

While defending his atheism/humanism as a worldview superior to Christianity, a friend of mine raised an interesting point that I thought would make a good column. He argued that his humanism was better supported than Christianity for the simple fact that it is not based upon anything as flimsy as trust in ancient, supposedly historical, writings. On his view, certain philosophies ought to be adopted and implemented in order to make life better for humans as a whole. The example he gave was Martin Luther King Jr. King had many good things to say and many of his recommendations for human happiness were indeed wise. They therefore ought to be implemented for their pragmatic value alone. It mattered nothing to my atheist friend if Dr. King ever actually said these things that are now attributed to him, or, for that matter, whether or not the man ever existed at all. On my friend’s humanism, what matters is the principle, not who first introduced it. This, he said, made his worldview superior to Christianity because Christianity is based squarely upon the belief that Jesus actually came and did the things said of Him in the New Testament. Since all historical claims, including biblical ones, can be rationally denied, Christianity necessarily sits upon a flimsier foundation than that of the humanist worldview.¹ In short, my friend argued that a worldview based upon pragmatic principles that can be demonstrated as such (like his humanism) ought to be adopted over a worldview which is based upon the belief that certain events have taken place in the past (like Christianity). So what of this claim? Is it really a strong point for atheism/humanism? There are several reasons why we confidently answer this question in the emphatic negative.

1. Logically deniable does not equal likely false. Recall that the atheist here claims that he rejects worldviews based upon the proposition that certain events are historic simply because such propositions can always be rationally denied. The problem for him is two-fold. First, it must be pointed out that his own worldview can be rationally denied as well. For instance, it is logically possible that God does exist, making atheism rationally deniable. If rational deniability is cause for rejecting a worldview outright, then atheism ought to be rejected as well. Secondly, such a view falsely equates “rationally deniable” with “likely false.” Most of what we believe to be true can be rationally denied, even much of what we believe concerning the right application of logic. For example, modus ponens, or the affirming the antecedent, is a familiar rule of inference. This fairly low-level reasoning process runs as follows:

If P, then Q.
P.
Therefore, Q.

While the validity of modus ponens seems undeniable, the way in which we apply it on any specific occasion may be rationally denied. This is similar to mathematics. Though the basic rules of mathematics seem undeniable, it is always possible that we have done our calculations wrong, especially when complex problems are being worked out. Nevertheless, in fairly low level logical and mathematical reasoning, the chances of being in error appear low, even if the possibility of being in error remains looming over our heads. The point is, just because a particular proposition may be rationally denied, this in no way shows that the proposition in question is likely false. It is possible (logically) that the external world is just an illusion, or that all the people you know are actually android replicas, but who in their right mind would seriously contend that such propositions are likely? Such notions border on the absurd. Similarly, while Christianity’s historic claims may indeed be rationally denied, the burden of proof is on the detractor to show that they are likely false. Conversely, the Christian himself does, I think, shoulder some burden to show that Christianity’s historic claims are likely true. I have attempted to do this elsewhere on this site.² Others have done a much more thorough job of it.³

2. Is the humanist’s philosophy pragmatic? Quite apart from the fact that pragmatism as an arbiter of truth is notoriously arbitrary, we must ask our atheist how it is that he knows that a particular philosophy is pragmatic. If he responds that it has been shown pragmatic historically, then his entire argument against Christianity becomes self refuting. That is to say, his whole case rests upon the same “flimsy” foundation as the Christian’s, namely, that certain events have actually transpired in the past. Our atheist can therefore hardly indict the Christian on the grounds that all historic claims can be rationally denied when his own worldview rest squarely on top of the proposition that certain events have actually transpired in the past!  Without this “flimsy”, rationally deniable foundation, the atheist is left with nothing concrete on which to base his decision to implement a given philosophy.

3. Is personal experience the arbiter? The atheist, it seems to me, has one last option, namely, that of personal experience. Perhaps he knows that a particular philosophy is pragmatic because he has personally experienced the benefits of implementing it. If this is his argument then certain factors must also be taken into account. For instance, it must be admitted that the atheist, like everybody else, is severely limited in his experience. He is additionally limited in knowledge and understanding of the complexities involved in all the causal connections that must take place should a given philosophy be adopted societally.⁴ Obviously this fact alone would call into question the choice to adopt any given philosophy no less than the decision to embrace a Christian worldview. Furthermore, it must be recognized that there are countless competing philosophies based on the experiences of others. How does one decide between them?  It seems the only way to intelligently do so would be to examine the historical record, to see what kind of results were achieved by implementing certain philosophies in the past. The problem of course is that we are back to square one, namely, the place where we decide to use our knowledge of the past as the foundation for our worldview. Again, how can the Christian worldview then be indicted as inferior when all chief competitors must also rest on beliefs about the past?

Conclusion:

Claims that Christianity is an inferior worldview to humanism are once again shown to be both false and self refuting. Unless one is willing to embrace pure subjectivism (another self refuting system of thought) it seems that some knowledge of the past is essential to erecting a coherent worldview. It hardly makes sense therefore to indict Christianity for its basis in the historic claims of the Bible.

Notes and References:

1. I first heard this type of reasoning while dialoguing with the Atheists Students Association at the U of W. Since then I have heard both Christopher Hitchens and John Loftus make similar statements in debate. It seems this is a currently popular line of reasoning among humanists, which is exactly why I am attempting to tackle it here.

2. See my online book, “100 Reasons to Trust New Testament History.” Also consult our audio “Spitfire Sessions” where Arron Bergeron and I erect a positive case for the New Testament along with offering what we think are reasonable rebuttals to the most common objections to the New Testament as a reliable historical document. [starts at session 28].

3. The names of the men who have covered this territory in the most convincing manner (in my opinion) are Gary Habermas, Josh McDowell, William Lane Craig, Phil Fernandes, Colin Hemer, William Ramsey, and J. A. Thompson.

4. He is also supposing that the result of a particular philosophy’s implementation was actually what he perceived it was. In other words, it is always possible that the humanist has incorrectly perceived the outcome. Something else might have actually taken place. Additionally, the causal connection between the implementation of a particular philosophy and the circumstances following its implementation has to be inferred. It is always possible that there was no connection at all between them.